The Washington Post reporter Robin Wright,
a fairly knowledgable soul on Middle Eastern
affairs, wrote a piece yesterday that
discusses in some detail a complex arms
deal from the United States that is proposed
to give some $20 billion to Saudi Arabia,
Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, and Bahrain that includes
"advanced satellite-guided bombs, fighter
aircraft upgrades and new naval vessels"
to these six nations in an effort "to contain
Iran." Congressional reaction is reported to
be "mixed," while the administration
"cautions" that this is part of an even larger
deal stretching over ten years that would
also give $30 billion in military aid to Israel
and $13 billion to Egypt.

The article suggests that opposition focuses
primarily on Saudi Arabia's part of the
proposed package, citing "that the kingdom
has been unhelpful in Iraq and unreliable in
fighting terrorism." In addition, King Abdullah
has reportedly said that the US presence in
Iraq is an "illegitimate occupation" and the
Saudi regime has "been unwilling or unable
to stop suicide bombers who have ended
up in Iraq."

The arms control groups make an even saner
argument from this writer's point of view - the
region will be awash in weapons even more
than it already is, accelerating an "already
dangerous trend" rather than lowering
tensions. It is really hard to see how dumping,
however judiciously or rationalized, some $60 +
billion in weapons over the next decade would,
or could, stabilize the region, or be a real bulwark
against Iran. Israel's arming alone assures that
the states opposed to it, which Saudi Arabia is
one, would have fairly advanced weapons to
engage Israel with even if Israel can whip them
militarily. Everyone armed to the teeth does not
make for a more secure region, it would seem.

Meanwhile, an AP story today by Steven Hurst
and Qassim Abdul-Zahra states that a key aide
to Iraq Prime Minister al-Maliki is saying that
his relationship with US commander General
Petraeus is so poor that al-Maliki may petition
Washington for the General's recall. The issues,
according to the article, are complex and
somewhat convoluted. Al-Maliki is reportedly
upset that the General favors, and has acted
upon, enlisting Sunni tribal leaders, who may
have killed Shiites in the sectarian violence of
the past eighteen months, to go after Sunni
insurgents and Al Qaeda groups. Petraeus
has also been struggling with a military and
police force, nominally under al-Maliki's control,
that "acts out of sectarian interests, namely
Shiite, and not national Iraqi interests."
Petraeus has also failed to persuade al-Maliki
to sever his ties to Muqtada al-Sadr and his
Mahdi Army, a violent Shiite force that is
apparently answerable to no one including
the Prime Minister and that has probably
committed many a sectarian killing in the
past year.

In addition, the US Ambassador Ryan Crocker
reports general footdragging by the Iraqi
government on oil-revenue sharing and other
key "benchmark legislation" while the Iraqi
Prime Minister has been "angry" at "delivery
delays of promised US weapons and
equipment" for his apparently dubiously
aligned forces.

While one recognizes Iran to be a threat, arming
the neighborhood to the proposed degree that
is being contemplated seems like pouring
gasoline on an already hotly burning fire, and
with no reasonable assurance that the strategy
will move the Saudis, Israelis or Egyptians to a
more cooperative stance. Bahrain is a Shiite
nation, and any weapons flow there might well
end up in Iranian hands. Kuwait and the Emirates
struggle with corruption (as do the Egyptians
and the Saudis) so who knows what
opportunities for misbehavior and illegal
weapons transfers might arise?

Despite various statements about the success
of the surge, which I partially believe, but also
disbelieve, the situation politically in Iraq appears
worse than ever, and the military situation only
somewhat improved in Baghdad, and fairly
improved in Anbar province. Elsewhere, both the
bombings and the sectarian violence continues,
and the central regime appears weaker and weaker
every day. If al-Maliki succeeds in ousting General
Petraeus, touted by DoD Secretary Gates and
several GOP members of the Senate as "the best
man for the job," who can possibly succeed in
Iraq as a military commander? Petraeus himself
has already hinted we'll still be there in 2009
(which this writer has been saying all along),
but if he's not credible to the Iraqis, who could
be? VMS


Note: Written Mon, 30 Jul 2007 01:00:53

Minutely edited as of 20 August, 2007